S
631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian inhabitants in general.

S N
175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking, the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
S N
175 minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
657 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
563 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
669 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784, 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bïk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N
175 II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode
631 of Economy of the Minorities.
619

Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic conglomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
S N political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
175 of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
631 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
668 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
178 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
619 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road,
648 Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bïk's policy

towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one administrative unit.

The Eastern Turks:

The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through the organized use of water. The family organization among the Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain level of productivity can only be reached through collective labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists. A secondary aspect of Eartern Turkic social life is formed by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form "guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent winter camp site, since this facilitates better political control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders) responsible to the Chinese officials.

The Mongols: general remarks.

Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

SN 181 791 of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods, SN but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion. 181 The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious. Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency found especially within the extended family, which as a rule feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc., of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace, to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and SN government, can be described as the average conception of 342 the "good life:" The average Chinese of the Northwest lives 35 in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area, SN caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor altar being almost the only furniture.

517 Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by 571 the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course, 565 the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to 423 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the SN frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money- 565 minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials 571 and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time 423 holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia, 178 became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China, 668 showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep SN inclination towards Communism.

563 In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz, 233 Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

+195 years, ceased to be the leading metropolis, dropping in rank to
[633] a city of secondary importance. This decline of the Northwest
• [178] had been in process since the end of the Han dynasty and had
accelerated during the T'ang. The decreasing productivity of the
land made it harder and harder to maintain large bodies of troops
+175 to defend the Northwest frontier. Supplies for the defense forces,
724 not to say for campaigns to the Far West had to be brought up by
487 canals from the Southeast, a tenuous system which, once obstructed, would constrain the withdrawal of Chinese troops from far-flung outposts in the Northwest and render abortive any attempt at their recovery.

000 II. The Succession of Steppe Empires

A. The Scythians

Historically, the first empire to break out of the steppes was founded by the Scythians. They are supposed to have been a North-Iranian people, who nomadized in what is today's Turkestan and Western Siberia. The Greek historian, Herodotus, has left a rather intimate description of their manners and folkways. They are mentioned also in Assyrian, Persian and Indian sources (under the name Saka). Of the three groups of Scythians who inhabited respectively the Ferghana-Kashgar area, the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, and western Siberia north and northeast of the Caspian Sea, it was the last that set events in motion. In the second half of the eighth century B.C. this group fell upon the Cymmerians, a Thraco-Phrygean people settled north of the Black Sea. This conquest catalysed a migration of nations, the echo of which was heard even by the prophets of Israel. It was the first known inroad of the steppe nomads into the southern cultural world.

The Scythian Empire continued until the third century B.C. Its southward drive under the leadership of Ishpakai was stopped by the Assyrians in 678 B.C. Ishpakai's successors, Bartatua and Madyes, expanded their empire towards the south and the west. In ca. 628 B.C., however, they were repulsed by the Medes under Kyaxares. The Persians under Cyrus battled against the Scythians in the region east of Khiva in ca. 529 B.C. and 15 years later under Darius in the southern Ukraine. The Scythians finally were decimated by the Sarmathians, another North-Iranian nomadic tribe, who pushed the Scythians into the Crimea towards the end of the third century B.C.

There is abundant archeological evidence of the Scythian Empire. Their particular art style, the so-called animal style, set the pattern for subsequent craftsmen of the steppe. Its influence was felt all over Central Asia well into the confines of early Chinese dynasties.

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between the Moslems and the Lamaists.

As a result of the aforesaid complexity of its geographic basis as well as its intricate historical and political background, the Northwest's population problems are as complicated as its intermingling ethnic composition. For many years, the extreme northwestern province of Sinkiang suffered from continual conflict between China and Russia, although with the introduction of the Communist regime, the conflict seems at least temporarily resolved.

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The development of industrialization in present day China is concentrated in the Northwest. New towns have been emerging in barren mountains and in deserts, such as Shih-yu-ho (near Yü-men), Tu-shan-tzu, (south of Wu-su) and Shih-ho-tzu on the western highway of Urumchi between the towns of Manas (Sui-lai) and Ulan-Wusu. The first two sprang up because of the drilling of promising oil wells in the Chi-lien and Tien-shan mountains.

N 647 816

The China Academy of Sciences announced in December, 1955, that in 1956 a number of new research divisions will be established in the Northwest: a Petroleum Research Bureau in Lanchow of Kansu, an Agro-biology Bureau in Wu-kung, Shensi, an Archaeological Research Bureau in Sian, a Geo-physical Research Bureau and a Veterinary Research Bureau. (Jen-min jih-pao Dec. 16, 1955, NCNA. May 11, 1956).

N 816 185 435 [648]

Last November, the Northwest Branch of the China Academy of Sciences held a meeting at which, with the assistance of the Russian Korshekov an ambitious plan was formulated for the economic development of the Northwest in the coming fifteen years, with emphasis on survey of natural resources, study of petroleum and rare metals, exploitation of non-ferrous metals, agronomy, soil science and animal husbandry. In these discussions, the professors of three schools of higher education, the Northwest University, the Northwest Industrial College, and the Northwest Agricultural College, took an active part. (Kuang-ming jih-pao Dec. 13, 1955; NCNA. May 12, 1956).

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B. General Distribution and Regional Characteristics.

The Northwest Region has an average density of 28.6 persons per square mile, as compared with the average density of 160 per square miles for the whole country. It has the smallest number in population among all the major regions of China, as the following shows:

Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
North China	55,749,000
Northeast China	41,732,000
East China	162,682,000
Central and South China	186,331,000

According to official tradition, the Spirit of Hua-shan is Shan-sheng, one of the descendants of P'an-ku, the mythical creator of the world. Many other genii have, however, been connected with this mountain. According to the oldest legendary records, it was a female spirit, the Holy Mother, Sheng-mu, who was propitiated here to bring forth the all-important rain; but she also received sacrifices and prayers to accord victory in battle. More recent and still prevalent legendary traditions make the Hua-shan one of the centers of the cult of the Jade Maiden (Yü-nü) whose blessings are sought for the propagation of male offspring.

It might be added that the Hua-shan with its rugged peaks and valleys, adorned with rare forests and intimate expressions of the pious sense of centuries, belongs to the most scenic spots of all China.

The great temple at the foot of the mountain, one of the most magnificent products of Chinese architecture, has been transformed into an arsenal in Kuomintang times.

B. Religious Attitudes in the Northwest

In general the Chinese in the Northwest adhere to the so-called "Three Great Religions." Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism all play important parts in their religious system. In specific regions, Christianity, particularly the Catholic Church, has strong footholds among the local Chinese people. Where the people belong to the tradition of Chinese history and culture, scholarship and tradition have strengthened the cult of ancestor worship and the ideals and practices of Confucianism. There the blending of Confucian teachings, Buddhist ethics and Taoist principles predominates in the religious complex of the local inhabitants. In the border communities, strongly influenced by the nearby Tibetans, the Chinese include a large amount of Buddhistic observance and practice in their religious activities. They persist in styling themselves Confucianist in religious matters, but they devote their time and money to the performance of Buddhist ritual. It is reported that the Chinese of these areas are appreciably more religious than those of the more typically Chinese communities. Taoism is sandwiched into this all-embracing system of magical practices, necromancy and aberrant forms of philosophy.

Christianity first came to China through the Northwest and established its headquarters in Ch'ang-an (present Sian), the national capital during the Tang Dynasty. Missionaries of the Nestorian Church first brought Christianity to the trade routes in the present Northwest. The decisive, historically dated record in Chinese and in Syriac called the Nestorian monument,

These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an unjustified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living, internal and external, changed very little. Their families constituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this structural organization, there existed the military institutions of banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect and found them to be submissive followers.

In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts) populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their livestock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of a widespread educational system might be another asset for the Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes literature written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure, are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also IMAR Handbook, same section).

III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans

An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among

*563 181 526 [593] hunting and racing games. In playing such games all the participants think and act as equal competitors. All social and kinship distinctions disappear. The competition between father and son, if they all participate in the same game, could be just as fierce as that between two other persons.

*563 [184] In regard to relations between the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems, the attitude of the people in Ninghsia was quite different from that of people elsewhere. In Ninghsia, the Chinese-speaking Moslem leaders held that the Moslems are not a race different from the Chinese but that they are only a religious group. Because of this attitude the Ninghsia Moslem leaders advised their co-religionists not to undertake any political movement on the basis of race. This attitude eliminated or at least lessened the racial antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese. Another [178] significant trend to be mentioned here is that the traditional barriers between the Moslems and the Chinese have been melting *563 199 away in recent years. Fan reports that the Moslems in the northern parts of Ninghsia went voluntarily to Chinese schools and learned the Chinese language. Some of their religious leaders were alarmed and tried to stop this. But the people answered them by saying: "After our children have gone to Chinese schools and learned the Chinese language they immediately become useful in helping their families to make a living. What is the use of learning the Koran?"

799 Robert B. Ekvall is a Christian missionary who lived in the southeastern parts of the Northwest for many years. He and his wife did evangelistic work mostly among the sedentary Tibetans in the district of the Kansu-Chinghai border. He made numerous observations on the sedentary Tibetans and the Tibetan-influenced 798 Chinese. About the latter, Ekvall says: "In contrast to the violent *563 incompatibility existing between the Chinese and the Moslems, we 795 have Chinese and Tibetans displaying a mutual tolerance in matters of religious belief and practice... the Chinese of the border differ from those already described in that they place a greater emphasis upon Buddhism to the neglect of some aspects of Confucianism. In particular do the more uneducated tend to become almost entirely Buddhistic in observance; the scholars, of course, give greater place to the doctrines of the Sacred Books of Confucian teaching and always refer to themselves as members of the Confucian sect. Also, the Chinese of the border country - possibly influenced by the religious fervor of the Tibetans - appear more religious-minded than their fellow countrymen of the Titao district." (Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, p. 33)

*563 62 184 In speaking of the differences between the Chinese and the sedentary Tibetans, Ekvall observes that the Chinese village organization permits a considerable degree of individualism, whereas in the Tibetan village, communal activity completely overshadows

Central People's Government, the province of Ninghsia was merged into Kansu, (in June, 1956, the territory of the Alashan and Edsin-gol Mongols in Ninghsia was incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), the municipality of Sian was transferred from the direct control of Peking to the Shensi Provincial People's Government, and the Northwest Administrative Council was dissolved.

However, by other more subtle means, the control of Peking over the Northwest provinces and the ascendancy of the Chinese over the national minority peoples in the border regions were bolstered, not reduced. The election of 1953-54 signalized the kick-off of the much heralded transition of China to socialism. This was the General Line of the State during the period of transition which was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 24, 1953. In its economic aspects, it called for industrialization and collectivization, and in its political aspects, it stressed the consolidation of the unity of the peoples of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and Mao Tse-tung. (JMJP March 28, 1954).

These two aspects were interrelated, industrialization and collectivization aimed at bringing further the people in line with the policies of the Communist party and government and consolidation was to be accomplished by the employment of cadres and the party members to arouse and organize the masses (cf. decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in NCNA, January 8, 1954).

A. Collectivization

Under a deliberate policy of the state, intensified by the Korean War, augmented by equipment and personnel transferred from the coastal cities and facilitated by improvement in transportation, industrialization had made tremendous headway in the Northwest. And with industrialization, the control of the workers by the state also increased. By the end of 1955, 540 kilometers of the 2,800 kilometer Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway had been completed, further extending Communist control over the Northwest.

However, the population of the Northwest is still predominantly agricultural, and it was in the organization of the residents of the rural areas into mutual aid teams and cooperatives that the extent of Communist control over the masses is best revealed. The situation in the four Northwest provinces is as follows:

Shensi: During the year 1954, the program of organizing the farmers into mutual aid teams and agricultural producers cooperatives suffered a setback due to incompetent leadership. (Report of Chao Shou-shan, NCNA August 14, 1954). As a report of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party revealed (JMJP August 19, 1954): "After the summer harvest, due to slack

leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places, a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were suspended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

Kansu: In this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45,62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

000 northwestern provinces during 1955.

S Thus, even from incomplete sources, the number of people
175 sent out to the Northwest came close to 30,000. Of this number,
668 the bulk were destined for Sinkiang. The influx of this horde of
166 Chinese into Sinkiang was to safeguard Chinese Communist inter-
N est and Chinese ascendancy prior to the granting of autonomy to
[175] the native peoples of Sinkiang. As early as the summer of 1953,
*[668] Burkhan had sought to prepare the ground for the invasion of the
[166] Chinese. In a speech, he said, "It has been due to the great help rendered by the Han Chinese cadres from other provinces and the People's Liberation Army during the past three years since the liberation that achievements of the people of all nationalities in Sinkiang in their construction work was possible. Therefore, after the enforcement of regional autonomy, autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres to take part in work." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

N C. Expansion of the Communist Party
*175 Along with the assignment of cadres to the countryside to
*668 carry out the work of collectivization and the transfer of workers
178 and cadres from China Proper to the Northwest, there was also an expansion of the membership of the Communist Party in the Northwest. The induction of men into the Chinese Communist Party and into its auxiliary, the New Democratic Youth League (Communist Youth League), had been active from the beginning of Communist rule. In 1950, out of the 3,600 national minority cadres trained in the short-term classes, 560 joined the Chinese Communist Party and 1,000 the New Democratic Youth League; in 1951, out of the 1044 graduates of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party Sub-bureau Cadre School, 88 joined the Communist Party and 726 the New Democratic Youth League.

In May, 1952, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued instructions to strengthen the work of party expansion, and ordered the directors of the Organization Departments of local party committees to convene and to work out methods for party expansion. "In rural areas where land reform has already been carried out, we must recruit more new party members and build up our party organizations so that we may vigorously promote mutual aid and cooperation of labor in production," stated a Central Committee directive (JMJP May 4, 1952). In 1954, the announcement of the General Line for the transition of the state to socialism brought a further acceleration of the work of party expansion.

Shensi: From June, 1952 to the end of 1954, a total of 3,625 basic level (hsiang) party branches were established, increasing the number from 60 per cent to 86 per cent, and 36,833 new members recruited. Up to the end of 1954, the majority of the new

party members were from the urban areas. In 1954, 4,000 workers were admitted into the party, a 14-time increase over 1953, and in the city of Sian, 40 per cent of the new members were workers. However, the bulk of the party men were in the government where they made up 23.6 per cent of the administrative personnel. In 125 factories, mines, and government enterprises there were no party branches, and in 63 industrial units there were no party members.

In the rural areas of Shensi, up to March, 1955, less than 0.6 per cent of the party members were farmers. Of the 845 hsiang in Shensi, 156 had no party members and in 15 per cent of the agricultural producers' cooperatives, notably those in Yenan (the old Communist capital), Han-ch'eng, and An-kang, had no party members. In the remaining 85 per cent of the cooperatives, the only party members were the members of the cooperatives and heads of the mutual aid teams. In Yenan Administrative District, for example, out of the 106 new members inducted into the Communist Party in 1954, 82 were members of the agricultural producers cooperatives and 24 were heads of mutual aid teams, and in Ch'ang-an county, 93 per cent of the 358 new party members were from the cooperatives.

The focus of attention during 1955 was the recruitment of party members from the factories and from the farms. Out of the 38,300 new party members to be recruited in 1955, 28,000 were to be from the rural areas, 5,600 from the factories, 3,300 from government agencies, and 1,400 from the schools. In the first batch of 6,000 new members recruited in spring of 1955 included 4,000 model farmers and 1,200 model factory workers. The total party members up to March, 1955 was 95,000.

Kansu: Party organization was stronger here than in Shensi. In 1954, 3,400 "advanced" peasants joined the party and there was a total of 3,938 rural party branches in 70.54 per cent of the hsiang. 16,200 party members held positions in the cooperatives and mutual aid teams. In 1955, 20,000 new members were recruited, and plans call for the recruitment of 120,000 Chinese Communist Party members and 480,000 New Democratic Youth League members by 1958.

Chinghai: By the end of 1954, there were 3,121 party members in Chinghai, 732 of whom were recruited from the 3,471 national minority cadres. Out of the 190 cadres trained in the Shun-hua Salar Autonomous Area, 61 joined the Communist Party. Since it was reported that there were party branches in 70 per cent of the hsiang, party leadership is spread very thin. Of the three thousand party members in Chinghai, only 93 native party members were employed in party headquarters, and 865 assigned to rural areas. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were at the end of 1955, 9,328 members.

625 The above chart (chart II) is self-explanatory. However,
*668 in the past, the major work of the police station was the fight
• 178 against crime. At present, the emphasis has been shifted to political defense. Thus, the political section becomes a major section in the internal organization of the police offices. To
673 view the problem from another angle, even common crimes
*668 can be political in nature. A case of arson may be considered sabotage of state property. A case of theft may involve the stealing of state property. Murder may be viewed as a disruption of production. Therefore it is difficult to separate common crimes from political resistance. One of the major arguments of the Communists to defend their own criminal past (e.g. Chou En-lai has a record as murderer in Shanghai Police Department) is the political purpose of the crime.

3. Committee of residents

625 In addition to the regular police, the Communists have also
*668 organized and used the common people to maintain public order and safety. In cities, there are Committees of Residents. These Committees are organized by districts, each one controlling from 100 to 600 families. Under the committee are "cells of residents." Each cell includes from 15 to 40 families. Each committee shall not control more than 17 such cells. The main function of these cells and committees is to maintain public order. ("The Regulations of the Urban Committee of Residents," adopted by the 4th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 31, 1954, articles 2 and 3 in Peking Kuang-ming jih-pao, January 1, 1955.)

The rural areas have Security Committees, the administrative village being the unit with 3 to 11 members participating. Under these committees, security teams of 3 to 5 activitsts are established. These people police the countryside for the Communist government. The functions and power of these security committees are:

1)...Arresting and rugning over to the government and public security organs of counter-revolutionaries caught flagrant, derelicts and criminals wanted by law, but... have no power to try to imprison or dispose of such criminals.

2)...Investigating, supervising, prosecuting and denouncing counter-revolutionaries other than those caught in the act, but...have no power to arrest, detain, search or restrict them.

3)...Educating the masses to preserve the revolutionary order and supervising the persons subject to control in labor and production, forbidding them to speak and act indiscriminately and reporting in time to the public security organs on their behavior, but...have no power to

*668 533 545 Sing!" was sung eighteen times, while another song "Let's Sing, We Chinese Youth!" was sung twenty-three times!" (Ibid., No. 16, August 30, 1955, p. 32).

Misinterpretation

*668 536 Other troubles came from misinterpretation of the doctrine. The Communist magazine stated:

"In the January issue of the Worker's Literature published in Sian, Shensi, in 1954, there was a play written for the local opera theaters, 'Sell the grain to the State'. (Author T'ien Yi-Yung). It described a peasant Wang Shou-ch'eng who did not like to sell his surplus grain to the state, until his thought transformed. Then he sold his grain to the state...

But how did Wang Shou-ch'eng transform? Because his son-in-law Li Hsiao-hsien helped him to figure out the loss and gain in the following way: the price which the state paid was 33,000 a peck, but each peck was 30 catties; though the dishonest merchant, Sun Kuang-ts'ai, promised to pay 36,000 a peck, it was counted by the local big peck of 35 catties. According to the government price, it would be 38,000 each peck. After this calculation...the thought was transformed...."(Wen-i-pao, 1954, No. 7, p. 38. The peck in Chinese measurement varies in different places. Usually it weighs 13 1/2 lbs. The pecks mentioned in this paragraph might be a kind of double peck.)

Obviously, this thought transformation was not the sort intended by the Communists. Therefore the Wen-i-pao criticized this play for capitalistic thought which should be discarded. The right kind of writing to promote the sale of grain should be something describing the peasants as willing to sell the grain to "the state" at any price, gain or loss.

*668 The Communist propaganda programs often were innocently, but embarrassingly, twisted and misunderstood by the lower cadres and audiences. Furthermore, in nearly every propaganda campaign, there was a need for the exposure of evils. Even though the formula always gave final victory to the Communists, the exposure part often lingered much longer, and loomed much larger than the Party would like to see.

VII. Conclusion

*668 • 178 A real test of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda is now underway. In the past, Stalin was deified by the Chinese Communist Party. He was the genius strategist. He was the Great Leader. He was the eternal sun. He was the eternal steel. Now the Party propaganda machine must tear down this idol it created. If Party propaganda were as effective as it was believed to be, faith in Stalin should live in the people's hearts forever. However, if Party propaganda is as effective as it claims, there should be nothing that cannot be obliterated. The situation resembles an

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The situation resembles an old Chinese story which was translated recently by the Chinese Communists:

"There was a man who made shields and spears. 'Buy my shields,' he would say. 'They are very strong. Nothing in the world can penetrate them!'

He also lauded his spears, saying: 'My spears are the sharpest in the world. They are so sharp they can pierce anything!'

One day someone asked him: 'If we use one of your spears to pierce one of your shields, what then?'

The man from the land of Chu could find no answer." (China Reconstructs, December, 1955, p. 23.)

S 392 493 Five tractor repair works were under construction in 1955. Each plant will have sixteen or fifteen mechanized worships. When completed, they will be able to repair as many as 475 tractors and combine harvesters each year in addition to making other farm tools and spare parts.

S 327 398 399 256 288 399 231 439 There are scattered reports on other industrial developments in Sinkiang, such as: (1) the August First Iron and Steel Plant, (2) the October Motor Car Repair and Assembly Shop, (3) the Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant, (4) the modernized August First Flour Mill, (5) the Khotan Silk Factory, (6) Houcheng Airplane Manufacturing Factory, and (7) more than a dozen animal products processing plants, which process skins, furs and intestines for the purpose of exporting them to the Soviet Union. But detailed information on these projects is not available.

N S 121 178 463 5. Handicrafts.

The foregoing analysis concerns itself with the development of modern industries in the Northwest under the Communist regime. But handicrafts still play a very important role in this area as they do in other parts of the country. According to a 1951 report, the main handicrafts in the Northwest were as follows:

N S [286] (1) Cotton cloth. A side line of the peasant, it was produced practically everywhere in the area. However, the more important producing districts are: 1. Sian, Paochi, in Shensi, 2. Tienshui, Ho-hsi and Min-chin in Kansu, and 3. Turfan, toqsun and Aqsu in Sinkiang. In terms of quantities, the total annual output in Shensi is approximately 3,779,670 pieces; in Kansu, 3,505,760 pieces, in Sinkiang, 4,400,000 pieces.

N S [323] [433] (2) Pottery. The annual output of pottery in the Northwest amounts to over 4,000,000 pieces. Of that amount Shensi produces more than 3,000,000 pieces, Kansu, 500,000, Ninghsia, 200,000, and Sinkiang, 50,000. The more famous pottery-producing districts are: 1. Huang-pao-chen and Chen-lu-chen in Tung-chuan, Shensi, which have been famous since the Sung Dynasty, 2. Yaokai in Yung-teng, Kansu, 3. Ah-kan-chen, Lanchou, Kansu, and An-kou-yao, Hua-ting, Kansu. The production consists mainly of pots, bowls, tea-pots, plates and tea-cups.

N S 463 289 (3) Paper. While paper is manufactured in many places in this area, the more important paper-producing districts are: 1. Nancheng (Han-chung), Shensi, 2. Khotan, Sinkiang, 3. K'ang-cheng and Tien-shui, Kansu, and 4. Ying-chuan, Ninghsia. The main varieties are as follows:

N [433] (a) The "rough-edge" paper. Usually used as a writing paper, it is produced and consumed mainly in Shensi. The annual output is about 192,490 bundles.

(b) The "Flax paper." It may be made of white or black flax,

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439 The trade between Sinkiang and Afghanistan of the same year
435 amounted to 1,378,040 gold rupees. The details are as follows:
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Table IX. The Trade Between Sinkiang and Afghanistan, 1927

Description	Value (rupee)	
A. Imports:		830,500
opium	675,000	
horses	10,000	
furs and hides	52,350	
Russian metal goods	8,550	
almonds	3,600	
B. Exports:		547,540
cotton cloth	176,500	
cankas	94,500	
woolen carpet	80,000	
horses	57,000	
chinaware	21,200	
felt carpet	16,800	
donkeys and mules	13,000	
Khoten silk	12,500	
Grand Total		1,378,040

Source: Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien, 1935 ed., Vol. 3, p. T.95.

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*668 II. The Communist Period
43 Trade in the Northwest under the Communist regime may be described in two parts: (1) changes in volume and kind, and (2) government control.

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[178] A. Changes in Volume and Kind

As far as the physical characteristics are concerned, trade in the Northwest under the Communist regime seems to have remained more or less the same as it was before, because economic reconstruction in this region is still in its initial stage.

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*668 The following changes, however, may deserve special attention:
496 First, the Communists have taken great pains to improve trans-
491 portation in the Northwest. The most ambitious project, of
178 course, is the Lanchou-Alma Ata Railway, which they plan to complete by 1957. Other improvements include: (1) the Lanchou—Pao-t'ou Railway, which is still under construction; (2) the Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway, which was opened to traffic on November 16, 1954; and (3) the Tunhuang-Chinghai Highway, which links Kansu and west Chinghai, and was opened to traffic in December 1954. Besides, it is also reported that the original Lanchou-Chengtu and Lanchou-Urumchi highways have been improved upon, and the Outer Mongol a Great Grass Route between

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I: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia have been re-opened for traffic. (See section Communications.) With these improvements in transportation, it is only logical to assume that trade in the Northwest must also have increased in volume.

Another important change is the increase of production of the Yümen Oil Field and the establishment of four new textile factories in Shensi (for details see section Industry). Although there is no information on the distribution of these products, it is reasonable to assume that most of them are intended for the consumption in the Northwest. If this is the case, the import of textiles and kerosene, which were two of the most important items of the imports of this region, must have been reduced.

Still another important change is the enlargement of cotton plantations in Sinkiang. It is reported that the China Cotton, Yarn and Cloth Company in Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region plans to send five thousand tons of cotton to other parts of the country in addition to ensuring an adequate supply for local consumption. On November 3, 1955, the first cargo of cotton of Sinkiang was dispatched to Shensi for its textile industry.

B. Government Control

The Communist control of trade in the Northwest is more or less the same as that in other parts of the country. The main instrument of control is the state trading companies, which are in charge of wholesale trade and, together with the various cooperatives and mobile trading units, purchase of native products from this region. According to Communist reports, the six basic commodities in Sian, i.e., food, cotton cloth, edible oil, coal, tea and salt, have been fully monopolized by the state trading companies since June 29, 1955; and all private wholesale establishments dealing with those goods have been liquidated. More than one hundred members of the "capitalist side" were sent to reform camps, and the store assistants were either employed by the state trading companies or sent back to their native places to seek other employment. In the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, the number of branches of state trading companies exceeded five hundred in 1954, about eight times as many as in 1950. They provide the people there with general merchandise, cotton cloth, oil and fats, petroleum, pharmaceuticals and stationary.

Aside from supplying goods on the wholesale level, the state trading companies have also undertaken to buy goods from this region. Among the goods bought in 1950 are: (1) wool, 23,000 catties, (2) hides, 800,000 pieces, (3) intestines, 1,270,000 pieces, (4) bristles, 280,000 catties, (5) tung oil, 4,500,000 catties, (6) medical herbs, 4,000,000 catties, (7) cotton, 800,000 piculs and (8) grain, 130,000,000 catties (cf. The Native Products of the Northwest, preface, Sian, 1951).

I: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

C. Civil Aviation

*668 509 473 648 *195 The Chinese Communist Civil Aviation Company, which until the end of 1955 was a Sino-Soviet jointly-owned corporation and was still entirely adjusted to the Russian system, raised its service from two to four trips a week from Lanchou via Chiu-chuan, Hami to Urumchi. There was another flight twice a week, continuing the route from Lanchou to Sian where two sub-lines existed, one to Peking and the other southbound to Chungking. A third flight, also twice a week, connected Urumchi with Alma Ata through Ili by the Sino-Soviet international route; and the fourth was running inside Sinkiang from Urumchi via Kucha, Aksu to Kashgar.

IV. Conclusion

*668 489 433 The influential role which the development of transportation and communications can play in the creation of a favorable climate for sustained national economic growth, needs no elaboration. The Northwest which contains many of China's untapped mineral resources, and where the potential of agricultural development is fairly high, is a region where the man-resource ratio is low and the long-run economic potential is promising, provided it is linked with the populous regions of China and the outside world by better transport and a modern system of communications.

*668 489 499 178 Transportation and communications development in Northwest China used to lag far behind the other regions as did its agriculture and industry. After the establishment of the Communist regime, transportation construction activities in this area have increased greatly in the form of railway and highway construction. Of the total railway construction in Red China from 1950 to 1955, newly-built roads in the Northwest amounted to thirty per cent. Meanwhile the Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway, Lanchou-Pao-t'ou Railway and Chengtu-Paoki Railway were still under way and the Lanchou-Chinghai Railway was projected for 1956.

*668 491 648 Highways were constructed or renovated mostly along the old routes already in existence prior to 1949, some of which might not have been motor roads. Among them the most notable ones were the Hsi-ning-Tibet Highway, Sian-Lanchou-Urumchi Highway, Ansi-Tun-huang-No-chiang-Ho-tien-Kashgar Highway and the Hsi-ning-Chin-hung-shan-No-chiang-Kashgar Highway. Three international highways starting at Urumchi across the Sino-Soviet border linked up with the stations on the Soviet Turksib Railways.

*668 648 509 Air transportation was to be established to strengthen the Sino-Soviet relationship from Peking to Moscow via Sian, Lanchou, and Urumchi.

*668 489 433 It is true that Chinese Communists had devoted much attention to construction in the Northwest area, especially in the phase of transportation and communication. Aside from their shrewdness

70 percent. Otherwise infant mortality in China is figured at only 50 percent. And yet even here Chinese culture is gaining the upper hand. "Rdya sche sdong luch!" (If today you kill a hundred, tomorrow there will be a thousand to take their place!). Thus speak the Tibetans of their neighbors and masters, the Chinese. In order to maintain itself a vigorous race does not need the protection of European hygiene! 165

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"What sea is it from which ever to be freed is so very difficult?" 600

"It is the cycle of rebirth in the three worlds, in whose mighty tide of suffering we are tossed about."

/Saying of bLobzang sKalbzang the seventh Dalai Lama (1708-1758) at an examination./

CHAPTER XIII
A New Journey

"So you say you've been in Tibet! And were you in Lhasa? Did you meet Sven Hedin there? - or did you at least see the Dalai Lama?" These are the three things that cultivated Germans generally want to know from someone who has been in Tibet.

It was therefore my good fortune that I was attacked and forced to return to Hsining. In that way I at least saw one of the three important things of Tibet, the Dalai Lama.

It was the end of November when I rode down to Lanchow fu in order to fetch from there extra instruments and, above all, silver. The European colony in that city had meanwhile grown astonishingly; there were ten of us, including children. Belgian mining engineers and chemists as well as a professor of textiles had just arrived from Europe through the help of Paul Splingaert, the one-time interpreter of F. v. Richthofen. Engineers of the German firm were also expected, who were to put up an iron bridge in place of the old pontoon bridge, this Central Asiatic wonder-of-the-world. A faint awareness of a new era had penetrated to the chief city of Kansu. Indeed, a few weeks before my arrival street lamps had been put up, the little salad-oil lamps of Laohokow, which, behind their paper-shades gave just enough light so that one could make out the post on which they were placed. 178

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178 During the day a uniformed policeman stood beside them. The police force was also a new achievement.

Last but not least, a school had been organized for modern European subjects and languages - the charming English missionaries already called it a University. Two Japanese had just been engaged as teachers. Before I reached the city one of the pupils, a 25-year-old man, told me that ancient Chinese sciences which had long since been neglected, had been dug out of the attic, and that the Chinese would again begin to study more mathematics and engineering which were subjects that they had taught us Europeans several hundred years ago. We Europeans, he said, had pursued these studies, whereas the Chinese, because of the Manchu, had neglected them to some extent. "In Lanchow fu," he cried over and over again, "there is now a forest of schools and colleges."

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792 As soon as my financial affairs were straightened out I was again on my way to Hsining fu. In the upper part of the Hsining Ho Valley the road was in excellent shape. All the holes had been filled up and not a stone lay in the road. All this had been done for the Dalai Lama when he came from Urga. Inasmuch as not a drop of rain had fallen for months, /86/ the road was in the same good condition. Besides the stones, a great many temple gates containing images of gods, local idols and Chinese heroes had been removed. In fact, in the upper of the two chia of the Hsining Valley, that is in the narrow rock pass 25 li below the city, a terribly strong fortress wall many hundred years old, which blocked the road, was torn down in honor of the great Holy One.

However, I found the populace all along my journey to be in a state of anger over the Dalai Lama. The arrogance of his Tibetan horsemen knew no bounds. When a Chinese gate-temple did not come down quickly enough to suit them, the Tibetans promptly set fire to it and all its gods, and when the hsien of the city of Niembe came out to meet them dressed in his official clothes, they knocked him off his horse and beat him because he was responsible for this. In Lanchow, also, the inhabitants were by no means delighted with the Holy One. The fact that the Fan tse, the Dalai Lama who always traveled in a horsemen's sedan chair - that is, a sedan chair whose poles were carried by four horsemen, front and back - did not even alight in order to accept the greeting and kowtow of the tsung tu, the governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, was exceedingly hard to bear for the Chinese. When he arrived in Hsining fu the Dalai

361 are under the tschi li tschou of Tsinchow, were sacked by the long-haired ones and have since then not regained their former prosperity. Corresponding to the well-kept appearance of the dwellings of Tsinchow was a beautifully cultivated temple hill, Taischan, on which, among ancient trees, stands the Taoist and Buddhist pantheon, and which is also used as an entertainment park on festival days. In the Tschung tsch'eng, the center of the city, I visited a very pretty mosque which is over 400 years old. In the da (large) tsch'eng which is also enclosed by a wall, are the yamen of the dao tai, the tschi li tschou and a major; in the walled hsi (west) kwan are the large commercial concerns; while in dung (east) kwan are the extensive buildings of
[97] the apostolic vice-regency of South Kwan, in which I was warmly
133 welcomed by Bishop Ter Laak. These Belgian missionaries said that the Tsinchow district has a great many earthquakes. Count von Széchenyi knew about these, too, and in the history of China there are several major catastrophes mentioned which struck the region of Kung tschang fu and Tsinchow. Besides, in this region I noted many and large landslides. Here mountain sides of loess a kilometer square slide off on their clayey substratum along with all their fields and villages.

554 One morning in the main street of Tsinchow I met a good old acquaintance, the scholar Li, who was with us in Tibet in 1904. As he spoke of his present position, a satisfied smile broke out over his entire, broad face. Originally tailor by trade, then shoemaker, painter, beginning with his 38th year student, then secretary and maker of calendars, in between small merchant, finally schoolteacher for children of 10, then our scholar, he was now, in keeping with the needs of modern times, professor of French at the newly-built college in Tsinchow, and a very respected man who moved only with the greatest dignity and very slowly crossed the street, "practicing quiescence." Meanwhile he had made a map of the entire Tschou bailiwick, having been commissioned to do so by his superiors, and whereas at that time when we left Lanchow fu with him for Tibet, he knew only 10 Latin words, he could now already "count in French." He had 50 pupils of the ages between 20 and 35. His teaching position earned him 20 taels a month with which he also supported his family which he had left in Lanchow fu. He was now a small lao ye, a gentleman official, and on the street he was greeted on all sides with veneration.

•178 Of the new era which had begun for China one was little aware in Tsinchow, except for the school, its classes for foreign languages

and a few oil lamps in the main street. A dao tai li had made himself very unpopular with the population two years before because he wanted to force them to sweep the streets and because he numbered the houses. He aroused superstitious fear in doing so and it almost came to open rebellion. 178

Following the broad fertile valley of the Hsi Ho, one travels from Tsinchow at first for a few hours between rice fields and persimmon trees beneath which poppies are grown - Tsinchow was, before the war on opium, /327/ the center of opium-growing. In the afternoon we crossed over in a ferry to the northern shore of the Wei Ho (1,120 meters above sea level). Only a poor foot-path follows the course of the Wei River, and this serves the small amount of local traffic. The main road, a mule track leads over Tsing schui hsien with about 3,000 inhabitants (1) and 15 li from there to the east I 487 [349]

1. A day's journey farther to the north is the important and busy spot of Tschwang kia tschwan under the jurisdiction of the Tsing schui mandarin, in which only Hui hui live and in which the chief ahun of the entire region has his residence.

In the Tsing schui district I saw for the last time a veiled Chinese woman. The custom that a young woman wears a black face veil in the first years of her marriage if she shows herself in public, is as frequent in the district of Tsinchow as in that of Hsining fu. [56]

came out of the loess-covered clay mountains of the Tsinchow basin into granite and entered a tangled and lonely wooded mountain range which is connected with the Liu pan Shan and the mountain of Kung dung Shan (40 li southwest of Ping liang fu) to which pilgrimages are made. We soon lost our way completely in the ravines, had a wet bivouac in the woods and did not get to the large mule track and across the highest point on it, the Da kwan Shan pass (2,250 meters), for two days. From this high point we looked south across long, equally high ridges to the peaks, already snow-capped, of the Tsin lung range, while in the east we already saw the low-lying loess of the lower Wei Valley basin. I was now only a few hours from the commercial city of Lung tschou which is still 980 meters high, and soon one admires from below the mountain wall which extends in almost meridional direction from Tsin ling Shan to the Lo Shan, Niu tou Shan and Ala Shan and separates the present-day province of